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COMMENTS 
WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST: 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE UNIQUE 
NEEDS OF WOMEN IN PRISON 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In spite of the clear constitutional require-
ment that prisons and jails provide adequate 
medical care for prisoners, the poor quality of 
medical care is one of the most critical penologi-
cal problems today. This is particularly true, and 
particularly consequential, with respect to the 
care provided to many pregnant women 
prisoners.1 
The inherent restrictions of the prison environment prevent 
incarcerated women from meeting their own medical needs.2 As 
a result, inmates are completely dependent upon prison staff to 
respond to their medical demands3 and unless proper medical 
care is provided, it will not be received.4 
Comprehensive prenatal care is vital to a successful preg-
nancy. Quality care begins with a thorough physical examina-
tion.5 At that time, the physician administers tests,6 compiles 
1. Barry, Quality of Prenatal Care for Incarcerated Women Challenged, 6 YOUTH 
LAW NEWS 1 (Nov.·Dec. 1985). 
2. The district court in Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977), pointed out that because a prisoner's freedom is so restricted, he 
or she cannot treat even a minor ailment. Id. at 1133. 
3. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1133. 
4. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
5. Cal. Dept. of Health Services, STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC 
PRENATAL CARE 7 (1984) [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS]. The purpose of this manual 
has been described by the department as follows: "This manual has been developed as a 
guide for public prenatal programs. It is based on present standards for obstetrical and 
455 
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the woman's medical background and assesses her needs.' She is 
also instructed on the importance of proper nutritionS for her 
own health and the health of the fetus.9 To continually monitor 
her health during the pregnancy, a woman should have regular 
examinations throughout the duration.1o 
Prisons, however, commonly provide inadequate prenatal 
care.ll Pregnancies are handled individually and sporadically 
rather than systematically,12 and often both the mother and 
child suffer. In addition, the mother and child are separated 
shortly after birth13 which may adversely affect the mother-child 
gynecological services of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology and for 
public health practice of the American Public Health Association." [d. The standards in 
this manual will be used herein as guidelines for minimally acceptable standards of pre-
natal care, because they "incorporate minimal standards set and observed nationally for 
perinatal services." McCall, Casteel & Shaw, PREGNANCY IN PRISON: A NEEDS ASSESSMENT 
OF PERINATAL OUTCOME IN THREE CALIFORNIA PENAL INSTITUTIONS 3 (1985) (a report to 
the State of California Department of Health Services) [hereinafter cited PREGNANCY IN 
PRISON]. 
6. STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 10. The tests are administered to determine any pos-
sible complications or risks the mother may encounter. [d. The tests given should in-
clude blood, urine, syphilis, rubella antibody titer, Rh, antibody screen, PAP, gonorrhea, 
TB, sickle cell (as indicated), and glucose and sonogram as may be needed. PREGNANCY 
IN PRISON, supra note 5, at 20. 
7. A thorough needs and background assessment should include psychosocial, family 
medical, personal medical, obstetric and nutritional, and a determination of the individ-
ual's knowledge of her condition. STANDARDS, supra note 5, at 8. 
8. Adequate intake of nutrients is important for fetal growth and the continued 
health of the mother. [d. at 14. 
Since pregnancy is a time of growth and formulation of new 
life, it is a time when the nutrient stores of the mother need to 
be maintained to supply food across the placenta to the fetus. 
The amino acids from the protein food consumed by the 
mother are used by the fetus for synthesis and tissue building. 
Large amounts of iron are needed in addition to protein, to 
aid in synthesis of hemoglobin in the red blood cells, and car-
rying of oxygen from the lungs to the tissues. 
[d. at 27 app. A. 
9. [d. at 14. "Poor diets during pregnancy and poor nutritional status of the mother 
prior to pregnancy have been documented to be associated with higher incidence of low 
birth weight babies and increased infant mortality and morbidity." [d. 
10. At a minimum, a pregnant woman should see a doctor once monthly during the 
first 28 weeks, twice monthly between 28 and 36 weeks, and once weekly thereafter. [d. 
at 13. 
11. Barry, supra note 1, at 2; McHugh, Protection of the Rights of Pregnant 
Women in Prisons and Detention Facilities, 6 NEW ENG. J. PRISON LAW 231, 239 (1980). 
12. McHugh, supra note 11, at 232. 
13. In general, the mother is separated from her child within 48 hours after birth. 
Interview with Ellen Barry, Director of Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, San 
Francisco, California (August 1985) [hereinafter cited as Aug. Interview]. 
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relationship. 14 
This Comment will examine the deficiencies of the prison 
prenatal care system. It will discuss current litigation in terms of 
its impact on the prison staff to effectuate change and its possi-
ble influence upon future litigation. Further, three states' mod-
els for permitting the retention of physical custody of a child by 
an incarcerated mother will be investigated. 
II. MEDICAL CARE 
A. LITIGATION 
Historically; courts have approached prison litigation cau-
tiously.lll Change, because it required expert planning and coor-
dination, was better left to the legislature and the executive.16 
The courts intervened only if constitutional rights were being vi-
olated.17 Today, in the medical care context, court intervention 
results when a prison medical care system is challenged as viola-
tive of the eighth amendmentl8 of the United States Constitu-
tion.19 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishment inflicted."20 Punishment that involves the "unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain"21 is a manifest violation of 
the eighth amendment.22 
14. RICHARDS, Effects on Development of Medical Interventions and Separation of 
Newborns from their Parents, in THE FIRST YEAR OF LIFE ... PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDI-
CAL IMPLICATIONS OF EARLY EXPERIENCE 49 (1979). 
15. E.g., Todaro v. Ward, 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
16. ld. at 1132 (citing Priser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490-92, 93 (1973». The 
district court in Todaro stated "The problems of prisons in America are complex and 
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by de-
cree." ld. (citing Procunier v. Martines, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974». 
17. E.g., Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1132; Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 280 
(M.D. 1972). The district court in Newman added, "Courts should not inquire into the 
adequacy or sufficiency of medical care of state prison inmates unless there appears to be 
an abuse of the broad discretion which prison officials possess in this area." ld., at 278. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VITI. 
19. Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1132. "It cannot now be doubted that denial of medical 
care to a state prisoner constitutes a violation of the eighth amendment •... " ld. See 
also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, made applicable to the states by U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. 
21. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). 
22. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976). 
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The United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble,23 
established the standard under which an inmate may challenge a 
prison medical care system as constitutionally inadequate in vio-
lation of the eighth amendment.24 In Estelle,25 an inmate of the 
Texas Department of Corrections instituted a federal civil rights 
action,26 alleging he received inadequate medical attention for a 
back injury he sustained while performing a prison work assign-
ment.27 The Supreme Court held: "In order to state a cognizable 
claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harm-
ful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs."28 The Court stated that deliberate indifference results 
when prison doctors or prison staff intentionally deny access to 
medical care or when prescribed care is intentionally interfered 
with or not delivered.29 Utilizing the "deliberate indifference" 
standard, the Court found that respondent's injury had been ad-
equately treated, and that the decision not to x-ray the injury 
may, at most, have been medical malpractice.30 His claim was 
accordingly denied.31 
Two important principles result from the Supreme Court's 
decision in Estelle v. Gamble.32 First, the Court recognized that 
certain punishments are incompatible with "the evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
23. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
24. Id. at 104-05. 
25.Id. 
26. Section 1983 of Title 42 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory or the Dis-
trict of Colombia, subjects or causes to be subjected, as citizen 
of the United States or other persons within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and Laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). 
27. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98. 
28. Id. at 106. The Court stated: "We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference 
to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction 
of pain' proscribed by the eighth amendment." Id. at 104. 
29. Id. at 104-05. 
30. Id. at 107. The Supreme Court said that neither inadvertant failure to provide 
adequate medical care, nor mere negligence meet the standard of deliberate indifference 
and hence there is no violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 105. 
3!. Id. at 108. 
32. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
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ety,"33 and acknowledged the government's affirmative obliga-
tion to provide medical care to those it imprisons.34 Second, the 
implication of Estelle was that subsequent cases challenging the 
constitutionality of a prison medical care system must be ana-
lyzed using the "deliberate indifference" standard.35 
Litigation by women inmates is scare, in part because 
women are less litigious than men.3S Todaro v. Ward37 was the 
first suit brought by women challenging the adequacy of medical 
care delivered at a women's prison. The plaintiffs38 alleged that 
the delivery of medical care at the Bedford Hills facility39 in 
New York violated their rights under the eighth amendment of 
the United States Constitution.40 This case presented an institu-
tion-wide challenge to the medical care system operating at Bed-
ford Hills.41 Using the "deliberate indifference" standard, the 
court held the medical practices at Bedford Hills "constitution-
ally infirm."42 The court found that the use of the lobby clinic, a 
screening device whereby a nurse was appointed to screen in-
mate complaints and schedule doctor's appointments, caused se-
rious delays in access to a physician.43 The court also found that 
poor record-keeping and inadequate notice procedures routinely 
33. [d. at 102 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958». 
34. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
35. Barry, supra note 1, at 1. 
36. GABLE, LEGAL ISSUES OF FEMALE INMATES (1982) (a report prepared by the 
School for Social Work at Smith College). The study was conducted to determine if 
women are less litigious than men. The study concluded "it is not a lack of concern that 
limits activism, but a lack of resources stemming from the crinIinal justice system's fail-
ure to properly assess the needs of women in prison. Its consequent failure to provide 
resources relative to inmates' real needs creates passivity and feeds continued adminis-
trative neglect." [d. at 207. 
37. 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aU'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977). 
38. Plaintiffs represent a class "consisting of all persons who are or will be confined 
at Bedford Hills." Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1131. 
39. Bedford Hills is a medium security facility housing female prisoners in the cus-
tody of the New York Department of Corrections. Todaro, 565 F.2d at 50. 
40. Todaro, 431 F. Supp. at 1131. 
41. This case did not involve an individual claim for relief, rather it raised the issue 
of when individual failures "in the overall operation of a prison medical care system add 
up to deliberate indifference which would render the entire system unconstitutional?" 
[d. at 1133. 
42. Todaro, 565 F.2d at 52-53. 
43. [d. at 51. The circuit court stated: "The effects of the screening procedure were, 
on occasion, devastating. Analysis of the medical records in evidence and the testimony 
of five inmate witnesses revealed that delays of two weeks to two months in achieving 
access to a physician were not uncommon." [d. 
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impeded scheduling physician ordered follow-up care.44 
The defendants45 in Todaro argued that the district court's 
findings were based on a few isolated incidents.46 The court of 
appeals rejected this contention, recognizing that the plaintiffs 
had evidence of many instances in which access to care was 
delayed or denied,47 and that any limit in the number of exam-
ples was attributable to the court ordered discovery limita-
tions.48 The defendants also asserted that the procedures used at 
Bedford Hills were comparable to those used at other correc-
tional institutions.49 In response, the court said, "[T]his court 
has repeatedly rejected the argument that institutional practices 
must be defective in the maximum degree before a violation of 
constitutional rights can be found and corrected."50 
Todaro v. Ward51 illustrated what procedures may be con-
stitutionally inadequate.52 In refining the definition of "deliber-
ate indifference," the court indicated that whenever use of a 
screening procedure seriously delays access to care,53 and poor 
record keeping results in deficient follow-up care, a constitu-
tional violation exists, provided plaintiffs show more than iso-
44. Id. at 52. The court found that the delays were often several months. Id. 
45. Named as defendants were Benjamin Ward, Commissioner of the New York De-
partment of Corrections; Ian Loudon, Assistant Commissioner for Health Services of the 
New York State Department of Correctional Services; David Frost, Southern Regional 
Director of Health Services of the New York State Department of Correctional Services; 
Frances Clement, Superintendent of Bedford Hills; Henry Williams, Health Services Di-
rector of Bedford Hills; Robert Tschorn, Surgical Consultant at Bedford Hills and Marie 
Daly, Nurse Administrator at Bedford Hills. Id. at 1129. 
46. Todaro, 565 F.2d at 53. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 53 n.4. The court's discovery order was issued in "response to the state's 
resistance to broader discovery." Id. The court stated, further, "[iJf the records intro-
duced were atypical, the appellants were free to introduce others. This they failed to do." 
Id. 
49. Id. at 53. 
50. Id. 
5!. 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), afT'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977). 
52. A constitutional violation was found in "the procedure devised to screen in-
mates' requests for medical assistance, to follow-up doctors' orders, and to observe pa-
tients confined to sick wing ...• " Todaro, 565 F.2d at 53. 
53. Id. The procedures used at Bedford Hills are not uncommon. For example, in 
California, the California Institution for Women (CIW), California Rehabilitation Center 
(CRC) and Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center (Santa Rita) all use screening devices to 
screen inmate complaints. See PREGNANCY IN PRISON supra note 5, at 146-47, 200, 251 
(discussion of daily health care at CIW, CRC, and Santa Rita). 
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lated incidences. 54 Todaro did not specifically address the 
problems of pregnant women at Bedford Hills, but many of the 
procedures found to violate the eighth amendment impact sig-
nificantly upon pregnant women. 55 
Subsequently, in West v. Manson,56 the care and treatment 
of incarcerated pregnant women in prison was challenged specif-
ically.57 This class action, filed on behalf of all female pretrial 
and sentenced inmates at the Connecticut Correction Institution 
at Niantic, challenged the conditions and policies of the institu-
tion.58 Plaintiffs59 alleged, inter alia, that pregnant women were 
provided no special diet.6o They further alleged that the health 
of pregnant women was jeopardized by being shackled during 
transport for hospital visits,61 and from receiving inappropriate 
drug treatment.62 
West v. Manson63 was settled out of court.64 With respect to 
pregnant inmates, the parties65 agreed that the standard inmate 
54. The Todaro Court found that "while a single isolated instance of medical care 
denied or delayed viewed in isolation may appear to be the product of mere negligence, 
repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate indifference by prison authori-
ties to the agony engendered by haphazard and ill conceived procedures." Todaro, 565 
F.2d at 52. 
55. A pregnant woman often requires emergency access to a physician, especially at 
the onset of labor. In addition, it is important that she see a physician regularly through-
out her pregnancy. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text. If inIportant care is 
denied or seriously delayed, the health of the mother and fetus may be jeopardized. 
56. No. H83-366 (D. Conn. filed May 9, 1983). 
57. Complaint at 1, West. 
58. The suit was also filed on behalf of all children of Niantic inmates and chal-
lenged the adequacy of the facilities and services for inmate mothers and their children, 
but their claims will not be discussed here. [d. at 1. 
59. The class certified consisted of all women who were in or in the future would be 
confined at Connecticut Correctional Institution at Niantic (CCIN) in pretrial or sen-
tenced status, and all children whose mothers were or would be in the future confined at 
. GCIN. Agreement of Settlement at 1, West. 
60. Complaint at 9-10, West 
61. [d. at 10. Defendants had recently changed their policy of shackling inmates 
during labor and childbirth, but continued to shackle women going off the grounds for 
hospital visits, and during hospital stays, including the post-partum period. [d. 
62. [d. 
63. No. H83-366 (D. Conn. filed May 9, 1983). 
64. Agreement of Settlement at 1, West. 
65. Defendants were: Manson, the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of 
Corrections; Marie Cerino, the Warden of the Niantic facility and Mark Marcus, the 
Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services. Com-
plaint at 1, West. 
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diet should be supplemented with extra milk and bran.66 The 
prison would make available any special dietary supplements.67 
Also, the women would receive prenatal vitamins, and have ac-
cess to prenatal classes.6s Finally, the parties agreed that if a 
pregnant woman had to be placed in leg irons, a nurse in the 
medical unit must give approval.69 
This was a comprehensive settlement designed to meet the 
unique needs of pregnant women.70 Since it was settled out of 
court, it is unclear whether certain of defendants' practices vio-
lated the inmates' rights under the eighth amendment. The im-
portance of the settlement is that is provides a good, compre-
hensive framework or set of guidelines to be followed by prison 
systems that desire to change their present practices to accom-
mop-ate the needs of pregnant inmates. 
West left unresolved the issue of what practices in the treat-
ment of pregnant inmates are so inadequate as to rise to the 
level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs."71 
Harris v. McCarthy,72 which is currently being litigated, may 
provide an answer. Harris is the first suit to challenge solely the 
quality of prenatal and post-partum care given pregnant in-
mates.73 The action was filed on behalf of all pregnant and post-
partum women in the custody of the California Department of 
Corrections.74 Plaintiffs75 alleged that defendants76 failed to con-
66. Pregnant inmates will receive the standard inmate menu at all meals with the 
following additions: a) a serving of milk at each meal, b) an additional serving of milk at 
non-meal time, c) bran will be provided on request absent supply problems, and nourish-
ing snack food such as crackers, nuts, peanut butter, dried fruit, soup and granola bars 
are to be kept in the commissary of the facility. Agreement of Settlement at 13-15, West. 
67. The attending obstetrician will assess the dietary needs of each pregnant woman 
as soon after confirmation of pregnancy as possible. Special needs will be marked in her 
medical record, and any special diet prescribed will be made available. [d. at 15. 
68. [d. at 14, 16. 
69. [d. at 17. 
70. According to Martha Stone, attorney for the plaintiffs in West v. Manson, the 
officials at CCIN have been meeting their obligations under the settlement as it concerns 
pregnant women. Telephone interview with Martha Stone, attorney with the Connecticut 
Civil Liberties Union (January 10, 1986). 
71. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
72. No. 85-6002 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 11, 1985). 
73. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Harris [hereinafter 
cited as Complaint]. 
74. [d. 
75. The women named as plaintiffs were pregnant or had recently delivered, and 
were incarcerated at the California Institution for Women (CIW) in Frontera, California. 
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duct or permit regular medical examinations of incarcerated 
pregnant women." Further, the plaintiffs alleged that defend-
ants routinely failed to detect and respond to complications ex-
perienced during pregnancy or to the particular needs to high 
risk pregnancies.78 Among the other alleged infirm practices 
were failure to respond to emergencies relating to pregnancy and 
delivery,79 failure to provide adequate post-partum care, and 
failure to provide appropriate medication and vitamins.8o 
The California Institution for Women (CIW) does not have 
a doctor of obstetrics and gynecology on staff,81 nor does it have 
the personnel or facilities to conduct adequate medical examina-
tions or provide sufficient care.82 To help alleviate problems 
caused by these deficiencies, CIW has contracted with Riverside 
General Hospital (RGH) located approximately thirty miles 
from the prison.83 Plaintiffs alleged, however, that defendants 
continually failed to advise RGH staff of the status and number 
of pregnant women,84 that defendants did not transport patients 
to RGH for regular examinations, and that defendants canceled 
examinations already scheduled by RGH medical staff.85 Plain-
tiffs also alleged that defendants failed to maintain adequate 
medical records.86 The sum of these allegations resulted in a 
claim that defendants' actions constituted "deliberate indiffer-
ence" to the serious medical needs of the inmates in violation of 
the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States 
Id. 
76. Named as defendants were: Daniel McCarthy, Director of Corrections, Califor-
nia Department of Corrections; Anne Alexander, Acting Superintendent, CIW; Dr. K.K. 
Srivastava, Chief Medical Officer, CIW. Id. 
77. Id. at 6. 
78. Id. at 6-7. 
79. Id. at 7. "Defendants' failure to provide adequate prenatal care to plaintiffs has 
resulted in the death of at least one infant and the disability of a second infant. Defend-
ants' failure to provide adequate medical care following delivery has caused at least one 
plaintiff to have an unnecessary hysterectomy." Id. at 1. 
80. Id. at 7. 
81. Id. "To care adequately for female patients, medical personnel must have spe-
cial training in and sensitivity to womens' distinctive biological and physiological needs." 
RESNIK & SHAW, Prisoners of Their Sex: Health Problems of Incarcerated Women, in 2 
PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 326 (1980). 
82. Complaint at 7, Harris. 
83. Id. at 7. Inmates are transported to RGH for care. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 8. 
9
Schupak: Women in Prison
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
464 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:455 
Constitution.87 A settlement in Harris is likely,88 and should be 
forthcoming. 
B. ANALYSIS 
If Harris v. McCarthy 89 is litigated it will provide insight 
into which practices concerning pregnant women are constitu-
tionally inadequate. Certain of plaintiffs' allegations are similar 
to the challenges raised in Todaro v. Ward,90 namely that the 
ipmates are not receiving medical examinations and defendants 
are not maintaining- adequate records.9! These practices evi-
denced "deliberate indifference" to the inmates' medical needs 
in Todaro,92 so if they exist at CIW, the defendants may be 
forced to remedy such practices. If the parties agree to settle, 
the resulting agreement may be similar to the settlement 
reached in West.93 The end result could be the elimination of 
practices such as shackling pregnant inmates during transport to 
the hospital,94 and providing nutritionally inadequate meals to 
expectant mothers.911 In an effort to avoid litigation, prison offi-
cials may remedy their deficient medical procedures before they 
are legally challenged.96 
87. Id. at 1. 
88. Interview with Ellen Barry, Director of Legal Services for Prisoners With Chil-
dren, in San Francisco, California. (January 7, 1986) [hereinafter cited as Jan. Inter-
view]. According to Ms. Barry, the Harris litigation has sparked legislative interest in the 
controversy surrounding the adequacy of prenatal care in California prisons. A bill was 
introduced by Senator Presley that would provide for monitoring by the Maternal and 
Child Health Board of the State Department of the standards of perinatal care. Id. See 
S.B: 147, Cal. S. 147, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985) (amended by Sen. on Jan. 29, 1986) which 
would add the following provision to the Health and Safety Code § 1267.10 (b): "The 
Maternal and Child Health Board of the state department shall monitor and evaluate 
the standards and protocols of perinatal care utilized by the state department for the 
treatment of pregnant prisoners or inmates." Id. 
89. No. 85-6002 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 11, 1985). 
90. 431 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 565 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1977). 
91. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text for relevant discussion. 
92. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text for relevant discussion. 
93. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text for relevant discussion. 
94. It is common for states to handcuff and shackle inmates who are being trans-
ported outside the facility. The decision to shackle is a blanket rule, and hence is not 
related to an individual's partiCUlar security needs. PREGNANCY IN PRISON, supra note 5, 
at 214. 
95. Prison diets tend to be high in starch and salt, and low in prenatal nutrients 
such as iron and protein. McHugh, supra note 11, at 241. 
96. Similar challenges were alleged in a recent action filed in Alameda County Cali-
fornia. Jones v. Dyer, No. (Sup. Ct. Alameda County, filed Feb. 25, 1986). The action is 
10
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III. PHYSICAL CUSTODY 
Historically, incarcerated mothers retained custody of their 
children inside the prison.97 Prison administrators believed that 
the presence of children had a rehabilitative effect on the 
women.98 Children aided the effort to socialize women into the 
typically female roles of caretaker and homemaker.99 Modernly, 
children are rarely permitted to remain with their incarcerated 
mothers. In the overwhelming majority of states the new mother 
is separated from her child within forty-eight hours after 
birth.loo The mother returns to prison and the child must re-
main outside.lol This practice forces a woman to make alterna-
tive arrangements for the care of her child.lo2 Most often rela-
tives care for the child.loS Occasionally, he or she stays with the 
fatherlo• or is placed in foster care. lOIS Two states, however, cur-
rently have statutory provisions allowing a mother to retain 
physical custody of her child after birth. lOB A third state had a 
similar provision,I°7 which was later repealed.108 
brought by pregnant and post-partum women at Santa Rita Rehabilitation Center. 
Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that defendants place the prisoners in leg irons during trans-
port for hospital visits, and that the prison diet is nutritionally inadequate. Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Jones. 
97. RESNIK & SHAW, supra note 81, at 321. 
98. Id. at 322. 
99.Id. 
100. Aug. Interview, supra note 13. 
101. Id. 
102. See E. Barry & D. Lennon, Incarcerated Mothers and Their Children Current 
Options and Possible Alternatives 12 (1977) (unpublished paper on file at Legal Services 
for Prisoners With Children, San Francisco, California). 
103. Approximately 75% of incarcerated mothers place their children with relatives. 
PREGNANCY IN PRISON, supra note 5, at 91. The statistics used in the study are based on 
inmates in California facilities, but the "data closely parallels that found in national 
studies and profiles which have focused on the female offender." Id. at 59. 
104. Another 12% stay with the father. Id. at 91. 
105. About eight percent live with foster parents. Id. 
106. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §611 (McKinney 1968); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3425 
(West 1982). 
107. 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 121, § 22 (current version FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24 (West 
1985». 
108. 1981 Fla. Laws ch. 15, § 2 (current version FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24 (West 
1985». 
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A. FLORIDA 
Until 1981, Florida, by statute, permitted an inmate mother 
to keep 4er child within the institution.lo9 As early as 1957, sec-
tion 944.24(2) of the Florida statutes permitted a woman who 
gave birth to a child while incarcerated to retain custody of the 
child in the institution until the child reached eighteen months 
of age.110 
An incarcerated woman at Broward Correctional Institution 
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida sought to enjoin the prison officials 
from depriving her of custody of her newborn in Wainwright v. 
Moore. lll She claimed that she was pregnant and would be giv-
ing birth shortly.ll2 She sought to retain physical custody of the 
child pursuant to section 944.24.113 The trial court interpreted 
the statute as giving the expectant mother sole discretion in de-
ciding whether or not to keep her child.1l4 The appellate court 
reversed, holding that the paramount consideration is the best 
interests of the child. m The court held that since the statute 
was silent as to who should make the decision regarding the 
child's placement "[t]he rights of all interested parties; the 
child, the mother, the prison officials, in an appropriate case the 
father, and the State of Florida must be considered all in light of 
the welfare of the child which remains the guiding principle."116 
The court never actually said who was to make the final deter-
mination of whether or not the child may return to prison with 
his or her mother. 
Subsequently, ·in 1979, the Florida Legislature substantially 
revised section 944.24 to provide for a hearing before a court 
109. Id. 
110. Section 944.24 (2) provided in pertinent part: "If any woman received by or 
committed to said institution shall give birth to a child while an inmate of said institu-
tion, such child may be retained in the said institution until it reaches the age of 18 
months .... " 1957 Fla. Laws ch. 121, § 22. 
111. 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). 
112. Id. at 587. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. The best interests of the child are generally the underlying concerns any-
time placement of a child is questioned. The chIId's best interests are determined by 
examining his or her physical, moral and spiritual well being. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 13 
(1978). 
116. Wainwright, 374 So. 2d at 588. 
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judge to determine the best interests of the childll7 should the 
mother elect to keep the infant in the institution.lls No longer 
did the statute provide simply that an incarcerated woman may 
retain custody of her child. Following this revision, an inmate at 
Florida Correctional Institution at Lowell filed a petition for re-
tention of physical custody of a child born to her during her in-
carceration.ll9 In Delancy v. Booth,120 the trial court found that 
retention of custody by the incarcerated mother would not be in 
the child's best interest.121 This determination was upheld on 
appeal/22 and the appellate court added, "The [mother] has no 
constitutional or statutory right to raise the child in prison."123 
In 1981, the Florida Legislature repealed the portions of 
section 944.24 that allowed for a child to stay in prison with his 
or her mother. The current statute provides simply that a wo-
man shall give birth outside the institution and the child shall 
be suitably placed outside the prison system.l24 
117. Essentially, the welfare of a child born in a prison was within the jurisdiction of 
the appropriate circuit court. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 331, § 1 (current version FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 944.24(2) (West 1981». 
ld. 
118. The revised statute provided: 
If any woman received by or committed to said institution 
shall give birth to a child while an inmate of said institution, 
such child and its welfare shall be within the jurisdiction of 
the appropriate circuit court if the mother chooses to keep the 
infant. Upon petition by the Department of Correction, the 
mother, or another interested party, a temporary custody 
hearing before the circuit court judge without a jury shall be 
held as soon as possible to determine the best interests of the 
child. The department shall provide and maintain facilities or 
parts of facilities, within the existing facilities, suitable to en-
sure the safety and welfare of such mothers and children, to 
be used at the discretion of the court. 
119. Delancy v. Booth, 400 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
120. ld. 
121. ld. at 1269. The court heard testimony by a psychologist who said the prison 
environment would not make any difference to the child. However, Booth, the Superin-
tendent of the facility, testified the children had little stimulation in the facility. The 
trial court found that the child should not remain in the prison environment. ld. 
122. ld. at 1270. 
123.ld. 
124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.24 (West 1985). 
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B. NEW YORK 
New York has extremely progressive laws governing the 
rights of incarcerated women to retain custody of their chil-
dren.125 Section 611(2) of the New York Correctional Law126 al-
lows a child born to an incarcerated woman to be returned with 
his or her mother to the correctional institution of her confine-
ment, unless the mother is determined to be unfit by the chief 
medical officer.127 The child may remain in the institution until 
it reaches one year of age.128 However, the officer in charge of 
the institution may have a child removed at any time before it 
reaches one year of age.129 
Although seemingly limited by this latter prOVISIOn, New 
York courts have interpreted the entire section quite broadly. In 
Apgar v. Beauter,l3O an inmate at Tioga County Jail sought to 
enjoin the sheriff from prohibiting her from retaining custody 
and care of her child while an inmate.l3l A New York supreme 
court said, "[I]t is highly improbable that the Legislature in-
tended to lodge in the person of a sheriff or prison warden an 
unbridled power to negate without cause a long-standing bias in 
this state in favor of a child remaining with its natural 
mother."132 The court found that the welfare of the child was 
125. New York has adopted a prison nursery system. A nursery is actually main-
tained on the grounds of the Bedford Hills facility. E. Barry & D. Lennon, supra note 
102, at 1-2. 
126. The statute provides in pertinent part: 
A child so born may be returned with its mother to the correc-
tional institution in which the mother is confined unless the 
chief medical officer of the correctional institution shall certify 
that the mother is physically unfit to care for the child, in 
which case the statement of said medical officer shall be final. 
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611(2) (McKinney 1968). 
127. ld. 
128. Subsection (2) of section 611 continues: "A child may remain in the correc-
tional institution with its mother for such period as seems desirable for the welfare of 
such child, but not after it is one year of age." ld. 
129. ld. "The officer in charge of such institution may cause a child cared for 
therein with its mother to be removed from the institution at anytime before the child is 
one year of age." ld. 
130. 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 75 Misc.2d 439 (1973). 
131. ld. 
132. ld. at 875, 75 Misc.2d at 440. The court was responding to the sheriff's claim 
that he had absolute discretion under section 611(2) to separate a mother and child. Ide 
at 874-75, 75 Misc.2d at 439-40. 
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best served -by remaining with his or her mother.133 
The supreme court of Monroe County reached a different 
conclusion six years later in Bailey v. Lombard.134 Plaintiff, Ms. 
Bailey, an inmate at Monroe County Jail and mother of five, 
sought to retain physical custody of her newborn infant.135 In 
reaching a decision, the court was able to distinguish the fact 
situation here from that presented in Apgar.13s Apgar, the court 
said, involved a woman who was awaiting trial, and hence, "the 
rights of the petitioning mother did not at the time of the deci-
sion conflict with the rights and welfare of the child. m37 Here, 
Ms. Bailey was actually serving a sentence, which, the court 
said, was "subject to uncertain termination."138 The court held 
that the paramount consideration was the best interests of the 
child,139 and in this case the needs of Ms. Bailey's child would be 
better served outside the prison system.140 In reaching the deci-
sion, the court thoroughly examined Ms. Bailey's prior conduct 
regarding her other children, and found that "she had never 
functioned as a nurturing parent to any of them. "141 The court 
concluded that since the mother was the wrongdoer, in this in-
stance, her rights should be subservient to the interests of the 
innocent child.142 
The court in Bailey indicated that the decision of whether 
or not a woman may keep her child in the institution of her con-
finement rests with the sheriff.143 The sheriff's decision, however, 
133. Id. at 875, 75 Misc.2d at 441. The court found that "incarceration in a jail or 
correctional institution per se does not constitute such unfitness or exceptional circunI-
stances so as to require that a newborn infant be taken from its mother is attested to by 
the enactment by the Legislature of Section 611(2) of the Correction Law." Id. 
134. 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 101 Misc.2d 56 (1979). 
135. Id. at 651, 101 Misc.2d at 57. 
136. Id. at 653, 101 Misc.2d at 61. 
137. Id. The court stated: "A factual distinction which makes a difference is the 
conviction ..•. " Id. 
138.Id. 
139.Id. 
140. Id., 101 Misc.2d at 66 
141. Id., 101 Misc.2d at 65. The court found that there had been a pattern of par-
ent-child separation, and that when petitioner was asked some basic questions about her 
children such as their favorite color or the name of their friends, she could not answer. 
Id. at 655, 101 Misc.2d at 64. 
142. Id. at 656; 101 Misc.2d at 65. 
143. Id. at 654, 101 Misc.2d at 62. The court stated: "When the sheriff, under his 
[her] statutory obligation, considers the best interests of the child .•.. " Id. (emphasis 
15
Schupak: Women in Prison
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1986
470 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:455 
must be based on a determination of the welfare of the child.l44 
The court delineated certain guidelines to be followed in reach-
ing a decision. For example, the sheriff should consider the facil-
ities available, the offense for which the mother is serving her 
sentence, the length of the sentence, and the parenting back-
ground of the mother.l4r; Section 611(2) is actually silent as to 
who should make the decision concerning placement of the 
child. The Apgar court indicated that priority would be given to 
the mother's preference. The Bailey court, however, essentially 
found that the sheriff was actually the decisionmaker, provided 
his or her decision was not arbitrary.146 There have been no sub-
sequent decisions. 
C. CALIFORNIA 
Since 1929, California has allowed incarcerated women to 
retain physical custody of their young children.147 The first stat-
ute in this area, Penal Code section 3401, promulgated in 1941, 
permitted women to keep children under the age of two inside 
the prison.148 
In 1978, Barbara Cardell, an inmate at the California Insti-
tution for Women (CIW) and mother of a newborn, filed a class 
action to compel the implementation of section 3401.149 Ms. 
added). 
144.Id. 
145. Id. The court stated: 
The sheriff, in arriving at his [her] determination, should take 
the following factors into consideration: 
1. what would be the benefits to the child in staying with its 
mother? 
2. what would be the negative effects on the child? 
3. what would be the benefits to the child in being placed in 
foster care by the Department of Social Services? 
4. what would be the negative effects of foster care on the 
child?" 
Id., 101 Misc. 2d at 62-63. 
146. Id. at 653, 101 Misc. 2d at 62. 
147. 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 248, § 9. 
148. Section 3401 of the California Penal Code formerly provided: "If any woman 
received by or committed to said institution have (sic) a child under two years of age, or 
gives birth to a child while an inmate of said institution, such child may be admitted to, 
and retained in, said institution until it reaches the age of two years . . . ." 1941 Cal. 
Stat. ch. 53, § 1. 
149. Cardell v. Enomoto, No. 701-094 (Sup. Ct. San Francisco, 1976). 
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Cardell, while pregnant, informed CIW officials of her desire to 
keep her child with her in prison after its birth.150 She requested 
that they arrange for the child's stay.151 Receiving no action, Ms. 
Cardell sought a writ of mandate.152 She argued, on behalf of 
herself and others similarly situated, that section 3401, "created 
an absolute right in the mother to keep her baby with her while 
she is incarcerated."153 The court held that since the statute said 
"[s]uch child may be admitted to or retained in, said institution 
. . . ,"154 it actually afforded prison officials the discretion to de-
cide whether the mother may retain custody.155 
In 1978, the California Legislature repealed section 3401.156 
It was replaced with the Community Prisoner Mother-Infant 
Care Program (MIC).157 The program enables qualified women 
to serve part of their sentences in a "half-way" house158 with 
their children.159 A woman who has children prior to incarcera-
tion, or who gives birth while in prison,160 will qualify for the 
MIC program if she has a probable release date and maximum 
sentence of six years.161 If she had the child before entering 
prison/62 she must have been the child's primary caretaker/63 
and she must not have been found an unfit parent in any court 
proceeding.164 
Implementation of the MIC program has been slow, largely 
because the prison authorities claim that it is too costly.165 Due 
150. Petition for Writ of Mandate, Temporary Restraining Order at 4, Cardell. 
151. [d. 
152. [d. at 1. 
153. Memorandum of Intended Decision at 2, Cardell. 
154. 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1054, § 2 (emphasis added). 
155. Memorandum of Intended Decision at 2, Cardell. 
156. 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 1054, § 3. 
157. [d. § 2 (current version CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3410-3425. (West 1982» provides: 
"The Legislature finds that the separation of infants from their mothers, while their 
mothers are in prison, can cause serious psychological damage to such infants. To allevi-
ate the harm to such infants, consistent with the interests of public safety and justice, 
the following pilot program is enacted." [d. 
158. A half-way house is a less restrictive facility designed to house those eligible for 
partticipation in the program. 
159. Aug. Interview, supra note 13. 
160. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3419 (West 1982). 
161. [d. § 3417(a). 
162. [d. § 3417. 
163. [d. § 3417(b). 
164. [d. § 3417(c). 
165. Jan. Interview, supra note 88. Ms. Barry said that following the promulgation 
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to tremendous overcrowding at the women's prisons, it is now 
more cost effective to house women at the prison facility.166 To 
challenge the inadequate implementation of the MIC program, a 
taxpayer,167 and pregnant women and mothers in the custody of 
the California Department of Corrections filed an action.16s The 
complaint, in Rios v. McCarthy/69 alleged that defendants'170 
failure to implement the program in a "fair and reasonable man-
ner" violated the incarcerated mother's statutory and constitu-
tional rights. l7l It alleged defendants failed to notify the eligible 
prisoners of the existence of the MIC program in violation of the 
Penal Code sections 3415172 and 3418.173 The plaintiffs further 
alleged that defendants failed to provide them with applications 
for admission into the MIC program,174 that defendants arbi-
trarily denied them admission to the program,175 and that de-
of the mother-infant care program, it was actually less costly to place eligible women 
inmates in the community. Now, since the California Institution for Women (CIW) is so 
overcrowded, it is more expensive to house the women outside the facility. Id. 
166.Id. 
167. Nancy Shaw is the taxpayer plaintiff who was allegedly injured by defendants' 
failure to fully implement the MIC program. She alleged that defendants inappropriately 
administered tax dollars by failing to implement the program. Complaint at 24, Rios v. 
McCarthy, No. 330211 (Sup. Ct. Sacramento 1985). 
168. Rios v. McCarthy, No. 330211 (Sup. Ct. Sacramento 1985). 
169. Id. 
170. Complaint at 1, Rios. Named as defendants are: Daniel McCarthy, Director of 
the California Department of Corrections (CDC); N.A. Chaderjian, Secretary of the 
Youth and Adult Correctional Authority (YACA); Edward Veit, Acting Deputy Director, 
Parole and Community Services, CDC; Wayne Estelle, Acting Superintendent of the Cal-
ifornia Institution for Women (CIW); Robert Borg, Superintendent of the California Re-
habilitation Center. Id. 
171. Complaint at 2, Rios. 
172. Id. at 8-9. California Penal Code section 3415 requires the probation depart-
ment to notify eligible women of the existence of the MIC program. CAL. PENAL CODE § 
3415 (West 1982). 
173. Women who give birth while serving their sentence must be notified about the 
MIC program. Id. § 3418. 
174. Complaint at 9, Rios. The complaint alleges that defendants have an obligation, 
pursuant to California Penal Code sections 3416, 3417, 3419 and 3420, to provide poten-
tially eligible women with applications if they are requested. Defendants allegedly give 
plaintiffs outdated applications or simply fail to give them any applications. Id. at 9-10. 
175. Id. at 10. Examples of the allegedly arbitrary reasons for denying plaintiffs ad-
mission to the program include: (1) excluding women with more than one child from 
eligibility even though the language of the statute reads "[i]nmates who have one or 
more children ... ," CAL. PENAL CODE § 3411 (West 1982) (emphasis added), (2) exclud-
ing women who do not have birth certificates although the California Department of 
Corrections Manual states that a birth certificate need not be produced, and (3) exclud-
ing women based on the nature of their conviction even though Penal Code section 3420 
states that only certain crimes are to be considered as affecting the burden of producing 
evidence. Complaint at 10-11, Rios (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 3420 (West 1982». 
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fendants simply failed to adequately fund existing facilities.176 
The superior court judge issued a temporary restraining or-
der against defendants.177 Defendants were ordered to immedi-
ately process the applications of the named plaintiffs.17s Since 
this decision, the parties have had one formal settlement confer-
ence.179 They have not reached a final agreement. The apparent 
success of Rios may result in a successful MIC program. 
D. ANALYSIS 
Forced separation of a mother and child may have long 
term consequences. A bond forms between a mother and her 
child that results from biological dependence and parental re-
sponse both during pregnancy and after birth. ISO A mother is 
particularly sensitive to her child following the birth1S1 and 
forced separation adversely affects the initial adaptation process 
of a mother and her newborn.1s2 Since the majority of incarcer-
ated women plan to resume care of their children upon re-
lease,ls3 they should be provided with the opportunity to live 
with their children during this crucial developmental period.1s4 
The MIC program1S11 adopted in California offers women the 
opportunity to remain with their young children. Unlike the 
prison nursery system adopted in New York/s6 the children of 
California prisoners actually live outside the institution. This 
situation may eliminate some of the negative effects the prison 
176. I d. at 13. Although hundreds of women are potentially eligible for admission to 
the MIC program, there are only four facilities in operation and fewer than a dozen 
mothers are actually placed in the houses. Id. at 8. 
177. Temporary Restraining Order at 2, Rios. 
178. Id. at 3. 
179. Jan. Interview, supra note 88. 
180. OSOTSKY & CONNORS, Mother-Infant Interaction: An Integrative View of A 
Complex System, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 519 -(1979). 
181. Richards, supra note 14, at 49. 
182. Id. The author suggests that "early separation can have an effect on the initial 
adaptation process of parents to their newborns and this in itself is enough reason for 
those responsible for maternity and neonatal care to reduce separation to the barest 
minimum." Id. 
183. PREGNANCY IN PRISON, supra note 5, at 13. The study found that 97% of incar-
cerated mothers planned to resume care of their children upon release. Id. 
184. See E. Barry & D. Lennon, supra note 102, at 7-10. 
185. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text for relevant discussion. 
186. See supra note 125 for relevant discussion. 
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environment may have on the children, such as minimal cogni-
tive stimulation.Is7 In California, the children reside in a more 
home-like setting and can spend long periods of time with their 
mothers. Once fully implemented, the MIC program may prove 
to be an effective method of keeping mother and child together 
while minimizing the adverse effects of the prison environment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In an effort to avoid litigation, and insure healthy, success-
ful pregnancies, prisons should adopt minimum, uniform stan-
dards governing the provision of health care to pregnant women. 
Deficient care that results in delay or denial of medical care is 
unconstitutional. Women in institutions who believe the care 
they receive is inadequate may challenge the system by alleging 
it evidences "deliberate indifference" to their medical needs. 
Women must recognize the effectiveness of litigation as a means 
to redress grievances. 
Few states have statutes alldwing for significant contact be-
tween mother and child. Two states have adopted different sys-
tems. New York's prison nursery system, although allowing the 
mother to stay with her child, may not be best for the mother 
and child because the children actually live inside the institu-
tion. California's system is better able to insure that mother and 
child stay together in an environment less restrictive than the 
prison structure. Once fully implemented, this may prove to be 
the better system. 
Terri L. Schupak* 
187. E. Barry & D. Lennon, supra note 102, at 24. The nursery at Bedford Hills in 
New York keeps the children in small cubicles which contain little more than a crib. The 
children are permitted few toys and hence receive little cognitive and sensory-motor 
stimulation.ld. at 13. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987. 
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